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It no longer requires feats of self-conscious defamiliarisation to question the 
institutions that underpin and naturalise national literatures. To mention a 
few such critiques of the past few decades: Homi K. Bhabha has pointed out 
that nations depend on narration to elaborate their cultural coherence (Nation 
and Narration); Edward Said has shown that literature sustains imperialism 
(Culture and Imperialism); Benedict Anderson has talked of nations as 
“imagined communities” formed around books (Imagined Communities); 
Trinh T. Minh-ha has argued that it is impossible to speak of ethnic identity 
without speaking of decentredness, multiplicity and hybridity (Woman, 
Native, Other); and Paul Gilroy has argued that cultural nationalisms can’t 
be understood outside the context of modernist internationalism (The Black 
Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness). Chris Baldick and Terry 
Eagleton have argued that literature became part of the education system 
because late-nineteenth-century England was otherwise short of mechanisms 
for social control. As Baldick says, Matthew Arnold “had often spoken of the 
need for a softening and humanizing infl uence to be exerted upon the masses 
in Britain, to wean them from class-confl ict and intellectual turmoil, and had 
offered poetry as a means to that end” (65). As part of his own argument about 
literary nationalism Eagleton cites Baldick’s quoting of George Gordon, an 
early Oxford Professor of English, who announced in his inaugural address:
England is sick, and [. . .] English literature must save it. The churches 
(as I understand) having failed, and social remedies being slow, English 
literature now has a triple function: still, I suppose, to delight and 
instruct us, but also, and above all, to save our souls and heal the state. 
(23)
That certain conceptual terrains and rhetorical moves are now prosaic to 
academic practice is a marker of the paradigm shifts that have taken place 
in the humanities since the late 1960s. New critical practices derived from 
Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, queer theory and postcolonialism have 
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all used strategies of defamiliarisation, based on the principle that not only 
are appearances deceptive, but critical outcomes are often counter-intuitive. 
Perhaps because of this, as Eagleton wrote of literary theory in 1983, “not 
much of this theoretical revolution has yet to spread beyond a circle of 
specialists and enthusiasts: it has still to make its impact on the student of 
literature and the general reader” (vii). Eagleton’s remark remains true now, 
over two decades later, at least in so far as dominant public modes of critique 
in Australia are concerned. What makes his comment relevant here, in the 
context of discussion about the public effi cacy of contemporary critical 
theory in Australia, is the powerful role that “pre-revolutionary” forms of 
literary theory continue to play as guiding forms of public knowledge. Such 
ideas inform the “popular critical consciousness” in so far as popular discourse 
about the humanities remains dominated by modernist critical paradigms 
such as Leavisism and New Criticism, even underpinned by a throwback to a 
residual Arnoldianism. 
In what follows I want to discuss the ways in which the practice of 
contemporary literary theory in Australia, along with most varieties of critical 
theory produced since the late 1960s, is losing whatever relevance it once had, 
not because “theory” has lost its potential force as intellectual and therefore 
public discourse or because its “moment” has passed, but because the contexts 
in which it operated have radically changed. To put it another way, there 
has been much discussion about the “end of theory” in recent times, but 
not much about the crisis of liberalism. The present crisis in theory, I argue, 
has occurred because “theory” is an oppositional discourse of critique whose 
traditional “target”, liberalism, is in a state of deep crisis, having begun to lose 
its status as the epistemological axis of western civic discourse. This crisis, 
which goes to the heart of literary critical formations such as Australian post-
Leavisite liberalism, that have acted as handmaidens to liberal ideology, has 
occurred as a new political force has emerged, capable of making new social 
meanings and connecting them with power in ways that neither theory nor 
liberalism have been able to anticipate or meaningfully counter. I speak, of 
course, of the rise of the new conservatism and the increasing entrenchment 
of neo-liberalism, since the early 1970s, at the centre of most national public 
spheres, and its growing reach into institutional centres of power and everyday 
social meanings. The relative failure to understand how the contexts in which 
it operates have changed and to study, understand and engage this new force, 
I argue, is an important underlying reason for the decreasing relevance of 
“theory”. Moreover, as I will also argue, as it reacts to crisis, literary liberalism 
has begun to transform itself in increasingly self-refl exive ways, such that the 
differences between it and theory are less sharp. Literary liberals, who were 
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among the main antagonists of critical theorists at the outset of the culture 
wars now fi nd themselves as much under attack as literary theorists and both 
struggle for relevance in a climate of conservative market populism. My focus 
here is on literary theory in Australia in part because I am familiar with it, 
but also because the strands of the above transformation, and the possible 
agendas that follow from them, are particularly apparent in the Australian 
literary-cultural sphere. The logic of traditional liberal literary theory in its 
various strands, I argue, is always raced and nationalist, as are the stakes in the 
conservative attacks on both liberalism and contemporary critical theory.
Addressing such issues fi rst requires developing an understanding of how 
Australian literary liberalism works. Here I won’t attempt a comprehensive 
defi nition of this formation so much as I will sketch its outlines especially 
in so far as it is complicit with a white patrician nationalism that, in crisis, 
has arguably begun to fracture and contest itself in response to the new 
conservative politics of race. 
II 
The continued tenure of post-war forms of literary criticism in the public 
imagination coincides with a wider crisis to do with the way information 
circulates and a question of what the canonical forms of information are, 
including a crisis in the status of literature itself. Literature, now, looks less like 
a central canonical cultural form and more like a sub-cultural pursuit. Since 
the mid-1950s television, cinema, popular music, and design have all staked 
a claim as sites of cultural knowledge, and have produced social meanings 
that many fi nd no less compelling than those produced by literature. Genre 
fi ction now plays a signifi cant role in both the publishing marketplace and 
the cultural sphere. As Simon During says, “literature is becoming less and 
less a living heritage and more and more a pile of old and aging books” (227). 
But if literature has declined in relevance to the point where it is the pursuit 
of “geeks”, as During (himself a self-confessed literary “geek”) has put it, then 
what other functions might literature nevertheless have (227)? According to 
During, the idea of literature lives out a remaining half-life in three different 
spheres. First, it’s fetishised by those “writers, journalistic hacks and a few 
academics” still devoted to the literary ideal, and who are responsible for the 
“mummifi cation” of the over-hyped but ultimately empty zombie-literature 
that “mimes life” in media reviews, writers’ festivals, prize ceremonies, grant 
distribution and so on (227). Second, as a minor art it becomes available to 
marginalised groups as an arena for articulating political struggle. Third, it 
gets taken up by the aforementioned “geeks”, who are self-recognised cultists 
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along the lines of literary trainspotters or computer nerds for whom literature 
is more interesting as a set of possible taxonomies than as a set of social 
possibilities. 
Another ongoing literary function, unmentioned by During, is hegemonic. 
What remains of literature isn’t simply a “pile of old and aging books”, but a 
powerful set of ideological effects. These continue to produce meanings that 
have little to do with whether or not literary books are written or read. In 
particular, post-war forms of criticism such as New Criticism and Leavisism 
helped perpetuate a post-Romantic aesthetic turn in literary criticism that 
remains relevant in settler nations such as Australia. Such forms of criticism 
inaugurate a critical language, a class of intellectuals who speak that language, 
and an audience for that language that together work to delimit the terms of 
discussion even as Australian writers and critics engage with topical issues such 
as race politics. Even where political questions are broached, engagement has 
been at the level of the symbol and has tended to orient around individuated 
notions of “tolerance” and “inclusion” (coded assimilation), rather than 
approach questions of racialised social agency or cultural context. At the same 
time, the dominant forms of public criticism, as spoken in newspaper book 
reviews, author interviews, prize-giving speeches, literary festival sessions, and 
so on, explicitly exclude alternative critical models, arguably because of their 
strong interrogation of the (white) conditions of public knowledge. Literary 
criticism as it exists in the popular critical consciousness, in short, continues 
to function as a veiled defence of colonialism and white nationalism. 
Literary trainspotters and already marginalised groups don’t have much say 
in the construction of national literatures, except by default. The purveyors 
of “zombie-lit”, on the other hand, often do. This is particularly the case in 
places where there is perceived to be still something at stake in building and 
maintaining a national canon, and where the process of national “healing” 
spoken of by Gordon is compulsively re-enacted as a part of a legacy of 
postcolonialism. As During says, Australia “isn’t [a] good country for literary 
geeks [. . .] with the will to produce a great national culture”, demonstrated 
by a “dull” literary culture and a “huge governmental investment in literary 
pedagogy and culture” (228). Sneja Gunew has explained how such formations 
mitigate against government funding for NESB writers:
It is not that they haven’t been producing art; the problem is that their 
work is neither given the kind of support it deserves nor recognised as 
part of the national culture [. . .] This aspect of the arts-funding area is 
animated by principles of access and equity that by current defi nitions 
are incompatible with those questions of aesthetic judgement or 
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“excellence” in the arts which the Australia Council defi nes as its major 
mission. (16-17)
Chris Baldick is blunt in his assessment of how national literatures work. 
Keeping the Huns from the door is how Baldick sums up English literature’s 
brief for preserving national heritage. The “Huns” in the present context 
being both ethnicised “outsiders” and those academic theoreticians who want 
to ask diffi cult questions, not least about the hidden class-cultural allegiances 
of literature. As Gunew’s remarks suggest, the bureaucratic mechanisms 
governments use to “keep the Huns from the door” in their constructions 
of national literatures are more or less straightforward, but those used by 
traditional literary criticism are less so. 
There is a clue to how national literatures work as strategies of containment in 
Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch’s announcement, made during the First World War 
in his inaugural lecture as Professor of English at Cambridge, that we should 
always be “seeking the author’s intention, but eschewing, for the present 
at any rate, all general defi nitions and theories” (Baldick 81). Eagleton has 
described the rise of aesthetics and the depoliticisation of Romanticism that 
took place as part of a general turning away from context-based models of 
literary evaluation and reception:
The effect of aesthetics was to suppress these historical differences. Art 
was extricated from material practices, social relations and ideological 
meanings in which it is always caught up, and raised to the status of a 
solitary fetish [. . .] by our own time literature has become effectively 
identical with the opposite of analytical thought and conceptual 
enquiry. (21-26)
The spirit of Quiller-Couch’s advice could hardly be taken more seriously 
than it has been by the Australian literati. Rather than contextualise works 
as social acts, the emphasis, instead, is on symbol, metaphor, imagination 
and the integrity of the creative act and the artistic work, as well as the close 
identifi cation of the artist with the work and its self-conscious moral content. 
If, as Baldick describes it, in the early twentieth century “literature became 
[. . .] a museum of national genius, but rarely an object of critical investigation”, 
then this, too, describes the sanctity with which literature is regarded from 
both within “zombie-lit” and its related formation, zombie-crit (82). There 
is much at stake in such a turning away from political enquiry in settler 
nations. Eagleton explains how Romanticism’s critique of early industrial 
capitalism was diluted: “If the ‘transcendental’ nature of the imagination 
offered a challenge to an anaemic rationalism, it could also offer the writer a 
comfortingly absolute alternative to history itself ” (20).
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Literature, here, fi gures in the guise of a secular religion that might ideally 
guide both the arts and wider public life. This is compatible with the “social 
mission” that, as Baldick has pointed out, was developed for literature in the 
nineteenth century by Matthew Arnold and others concerned about social 
unity, who fi gured literature as a civilising institution able to smooth over 
sectarian and class differences, a process that accelerated after the widespread 
loss of faith in traditional ratifying institutions of state and church following 
World War I. As Baldick says, “Arnold’s decisive contribution to English 
literary criticism was a bold extension of its claims to social importance. No 
less a task than the prevention of Anarchy now fell to the guardians of literary 
culture” (59).
In his In A Critical Condition John Docker describes the rise of aestheticism 
in post-war Australian literature. As Docker says, it was the formalists, in the 
shape of the Leavisites and New Critics, who set the orthodoxy, “instituting a 
metaphysical ascendancy” (87) and installing at its head a pantheon of writers 
such as Christopher Brennan, Kenneth Slessor, Douglas Stewart, James 
McAuley, Henry Handel Richardson, Patrick White and Martin Boyd, who 
fi tted the dominant neocolonial romantic ideal (80, 92). Of these fi gures, 
Patrick White dominates the Australian literary canon. During locates White’s 
increasing reputation in his winning of the 1959 W. H. Smith & Son Literary 
Award for Voss, the 1960 publication of Voss as a Penguin “modern classic”, 
his winning of the Nobel Prize for literature, the acceptance of White by 
academic critics throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the emergence 
of a postcolonial Australia that “required uniquely national icons” (12). More 
recently, White’s literary reputation has been recuperated in David Marr’s 
appropriately massive 1991 biography, written with White’s approval, and in 
the collection of letters that followed.
In his 1921 essay “The Metaphysical Poets”, T. S. Eliot spoke of the 
“dissociation of sensibility” that took place sometime in the early seventeenth 
century, splitting thought from feeling, that necessitated the twentieth-
century search for an ideal community to blunt the apocalyptic effects of 
modern industrialisation and mass culture (111-20). The “apocalyptic” 
movement was widely infl uential on literary criticism. It shaped F. R. Leavis’s 
idea that an era of organic community had splintered with industrialisation, 
standardising popular culture and rupturing the relationship between popular 
and high culture in a process of disintegration that was “the most important 
fact of recent history” (87, qtd. in Milner 114). Following Eliot’s lead, Frank 
Kermode developed his idea that a professionalised literary criticism should 
treat everything in terms of the Romanticist idea of symbol, metaphor and 
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the pure Image, not just Eliot’s preferred seventeenth-century metaphysical 
poets (138-61). As John Docker says, for Kermode, “to be truly artistic, truly 
literary, is to be metaphysical, to be divorced from and opposed to the world 
of social ‘action’ and politics” (52). White’s writing too, as During has said, is 
notable for its use of symbols that are buried in the text and require decoding. 
His use of symbolism signalled a modernist transcendentalism that broke from 
realism in an attempt to “heighten life” through an allegorical, suggestive style 
of writing, and to refi gure the Australian landscape and colonial past in terms 
of a universalised metaphysical possibility. 
White’s modernist transcendentalism, according to During, operated in 
opposition to humanism, as seen in the fi gure of Voss who fl ees the values of 
“all-too-human society” in search of a “primordial, non-human order” (Patrick 
White 31). To demonstrate Voss’s mysticism and his sense that Aborigines 
offer a glimpse of what he seeks, During cites a passage where Voss gives 
Dugald, an older Aboriginal man, a totemic brass button. This same passage 
demonstrates White’s emphasis on symbol and metaphor:
The old man was very still, holding the token with the tips of his fi ngers, 
as if simply aware in himself of an answer to the white man’s mysticism. 
He could have been a thinking stick, on which the ash had cooled after 
purifi cation by fi re, so wooden was his old scarifi ed, cauterised body, 
with its cap of grey, brittle ash. (Patrick White 31)
The symbol, as Eagleton points out, was given a new valency by late 
eighteenth-century Romanticism:
the symbol becomes the panacea for all problems. Within it a whole set 
of confl icts which were felt to be insoluble in ordinary life—between 
subject and object, the universal and the particular, the sensuous and 
the conceptual, material and spiritual, order and spontaneity—could 
be magically resolved. (21)
White, according to During, is in some respects a postcolonial writer who 
writes against the naturalised ascendancy of European settler culture and 
who represents colonisation as a “fragile settlement of a country that resists 
shaping by Europeans”, such that the relationship between coloniser and the 
land is essentially tragic (28). Yet for all this, according to During, White also 
fails “to absorb the consequences of settlement for indigenous peoples. The 
Tree of Man, which is an allegory of settlement, presents the land literally as 
terra nullius” (29). As During says, “White’s descriptions of rural Aborigines 
never wholly move past primitivism” (30). Ultimately, White fails to take 
Aboriginal peoples seriously: “for him, native peoples were victims but not 
agents” (30). 
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White’s primitivism, as Simon During points out, tends to
repeat a metaphor that has done a great deal of political and ideological 
work in Australia, even more than in other settler-colonial states. 
The notion that indigenous peoples belong more to nature than to 
humanity has helped discount their prior claims to the country [. . .] 
White’s primitivist use of Aboriginality in Voss is doing the work of what 
is often called “colonial discourse”—the set of ideas and descriptions 
of indigenous peoples that smoothed the way for their conquest and 
naturalised their subjugation. (31)
The formation During describes here is patrician white liberalism—a raced 
hegemonic formation where non-white peoples fi gure as objects for white 
concern and as templates on which white “tolerance” is acted out, but are 
never granted the same social privileges as whites, especially the power to 
speak or act for themselves, except under conditions already circumscribed 
by white power. Metaphor and symbol have a particular role to play here. 
As Eagleton says, the work of critics such as I. A. Richards, F. R. Leavis and 
T. S. Eliot privileges sameness through the very metaphoricity of its formalism, 
and by emphasising “patterns of shared belief ” (17-53).
This same pattern of benignly liberal silencing, according to Ken Gelder 
and Paul Salzman, can be seen in 1970s white Australian literature about 
Aborigines. Novels such as Thea Astley’s A Kindness Cup (1974) and Robert 
Drewe’s The Savage Crows (1976) tend to objectify their subject even as 
they juxtapose “white liberal humanist guilt with the rampant exploitations 
and cruelties of white capitalism” (230). In Thomas Keneally’s The Chant 
of Jimmie Blacksmith (1972) the politics of this had already been made 
clear. Despite its own political concern for Aborigines, the book forecloses 
Aboriginal subject positions outside the realm of white liberal objectifi cation 
(see Frow). Keneally has since questioned his approach to the writing of the 
novel (see Keneally). As Gelder and Salzman say, for books such as A Kindness 
Cup, and novels such as Bruce Pascoe’s Fox (1988), white high culture offers 
a space of redemption that tends to stand in for analysis. In Fox, a novel in 
which the main Aboriginal character is named after an introduced species, the 
“novel ends with Fox’s painterly vision of a redgum in the desert, recalling ‘the 
visions of Tiepolo and Calieri, Lazzerini and Tintoretto’: Aboriginality comes 
second to this sort of Europeanization” (Gelder and Salzman 234).
The patterned link between the formal and the social persists in contemporary 
Australian literature, including in some genuinely popular texts. In Tim 
Winton’s 1984 Miles-Franklin-Award-winning Shallows, non-whites live out 
a half-life on the edge of town as a metaphorical part of “the land”, their 
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comings and goings marked mainly by obituary notices and not otherwise 
entering into the social life of the central narrative. Winton’s best-selling 
Cloudstreet, which won the 1992 Miles Franklin Award, provided the basis for 
a play that received an extraordinary popular and critical reception because, 
as some critics said, it spoke to Australia’s craving for reconciliation with the 
Aboriginal people (Neil Armfi eld and Nick Enright, qtd. in Fallon 23). One 
theatre had to install fi ve extra phone lines to cope with public demand and, 
as another critic wrote, “Every review from its 1998 Sydney and Perth seasons, 
every interview, every article, speaks of this giant, lumbering beast of a show 
with wonder, joy, and proud surprise” (Fiona Scott-Norman, qtd. in Fallon 
23). Yet, as Mary Kathleen Fallon pointed out: 
There were three “black” presences in Cloudstreet. One was a nameless 
character, the “black” narrator who wandered on and off the stage, the 
second was a shadow on a screen—the ghost of a suicided “black” child 
and the third was the invisible spirits of “black” children rising from 
the ground, their “presence” simply described by the “black” narrator. 
(23)
The narrator, as Fallon says, serves as a “sort of cosmic Uncle Tom, legitimating 
‘white’ occupation as a benign and benevolent ‘dusky’ guardian angel straight 
out of Christian iconography” (23). All the black characters in the play are 
dead, whereas all the major protagonists are white. Germaine Greer has 
described how David Malouf ’s Remembering Babylon (1993), which deals 
with the European settlement of Australia, plays out similar assumptions. 
Published in the Year of The World’s Indigenous Peoples, the book was well 
received and Malouf described as “Australia’s greatest living writer” by “such 
sensitive people as Antonia Byatt, Malcolm Bradbury, Victoria Glendinning 
and Tom Paulin”. Yet, as Greer says, “the only black [in the book] who is 
allowed to speak is the fake black” (11). Ken Gelder has made similar criticisms 
of Murray Bail’s Eucalyptus (1998), which he argues,
reactivated the bush settlement novel, an otherwise dead literary form 
in this country. But it did so both to distinguish itself from it, and to do 
it all over again. Eucalyptus played out a fantasy of re-settlement after 
the fact, wiping the traumas of colonialism away in order to plant the 
landscape afresh and stake an even stronger claim on it in the process. 
There are no Aborigines in Eucalyptus: they would only upset its vision 
of total ownership, of full settler immersion into the landscape: of 
living in Australia. (34)
Just as Aborigines are marginalised in these texts, so, in the context of Australian 
literary production, writing by Aborigines tends to be marginalised in so far 
as they don’t generally exhibit the paradigmatic aestheticism of canonical 
16 JASAL   7   2007
writings, are often autobiographical, lack self-conscious displays of literary 
virtuosity, or are determinedly vernacular. In Haunted by the Past, for instance, 
Ruby Langford Ginibi writes:
While Nobby was in the hospital he was examined by a doctor 
appointed by the police. He was also examined by a doctor I got hold 
of from the Aboriginal Medical Service. The two doctors’ reports were 
very different. Makes ya wonder, aye! (65)
First-person empiricism tends to operate as a marker of “bad writing” in a 
critical regime that values abstractedness, complexity, narrative distance, 
decontextualisation, depoliticisation, and the universalising, allegorical 
treatment of subjects. At the same time, the burden of having to be authentic 
means that Aboriginal writers tend to be locked into indigeneity as a genre 
where the best opportunity on offer is to document either racist oppression 
or static tribal traditions. Similarly, citing the refusal of NESB writers such 
as Antigone Kefala to “abide by the conventions of classic narrative” (74), 
Sneja Gunew comments, “[t]he charge of incompetence is a familiar one in 
reviews of works by so-called ethnic writers” (95). As Gunew says, it is through 
accusations of incompetence that critics strive to protect themselves from the 
voice of the Other, which might destabilise the coherence which underpins 
their own language and subject positions. 
But the point here isn’t to repeat all over again a well-known argument about 
the white patrician-liberal traditions of Australian national literatures, so much 
as to show how the knowledges produced by such literatures integrate with 
the popular, and to suggest that they transmute into wider public knowledges 
outside the mainstream literary sphere. This happens when well-known 
literary and cultural fi gures engage with topical issues of the day. For example, 
the idea of “felt experience” is a standard trope in the literary author Helen 
Garner’s non-fi ction, as it is in the writing of well-known public intellectuals 
such as Robert Manne, in so far as both tend to personalise their approach to 
their subject matter so that their emotional and physical reaction to perceived 
moral decline becomes emblematic of its wider national signifi cance. 1
As Eagleton writes of Leavisism: 
Morality is no longer to be grasped as a formulated code or explicit 
ethical system: it is rather a sensitive preoccupation with the whole 
quality of life itself, with the oblique, nuanced particulars of human 
experience [. . .] Since such values are nowhere more vividly dramatized 
than in literature, brought home to “felt experience” with all the 
unquestionable reality of a blow on the head, literature becomes more 
than just a handmaiden of moral ideology: it is a moral ideology of the 
modern age. (27) 
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Writers such as Garner and Manne don’t use symbolism in their non-fi ction 
so much as they set themselves up as symbols that embody the Leavisite ideal, 
especially a capacity for “moral seriousness”. Both present themselves as critic-
exemplars of the sort that John Docker describes in his writings on Australian, 
especially Melbourne, cultural life: 
In its social and aesthetic attitudes it develops the thinking of Arnold, 
Eliot, Pound and Leavis, in seeing literature and knowledge as central to 
society. It is a tradition which goes back to Coleridge’s social thinking, 
and his idea that “cultural values” are embodied in a “clerisy”, a central 
educated group, which stands as an ideal for the rest of society. (ix-x)
Manne is explicit about his infl uences. Railing against what he saw as the 
manipulative, potentially Holocaust-trivialising sentimentality of Stephen 
Spielberg’s Schindler’s List, he wrote: 
I was educated in a world where voices like those of F. R. Leavis and 
Lionel Trilling—who thought that the task of criticism was vital to 
culture—still mattered . . . I remain attached to this world. (The Way 
We Live Now 210)
Both Manne and Garner are members of a circle that, since the mid-1980s, has 
moved, if not exactly to the centre of Australian public life, then to a position 
of infl uence as a neo-Leavisite public sphere that does certain kinds of cultural 
work. Publishers such as Text Publishing and, more recently, Black Inc., which 
publishes books and magazines such as Australian Quarterly Essay and The 
Monthly, have played a pivotal role in sustaining Australian coterie liberalism, 
as forums for coterie identities such as Manne, Garner, Don Watson, and 
Raimond Gaita, and a powerbase for others such as Text publisher Michael 
Heyward and Black Inc. owner Morry Schwartz. Australian Book Review, 
edited by Peter Rose (and with Manne and other coterie fi gures such as former 
Morag Fraser and former Quarterly Essay editor Peter Craven on the board), 
provides another forum, as do their regular broadsheet newspaper articles and 
reviews. Small though this group might be, its access to various forms of what 
Benedict Anderson calls “print-capitalism”, in the shape of magazine, journal, 
book and newspaper publishing, allows its members to present themselves as 
avatars of a much wider “imagined community” (to use another of Anderson’s 
terms), who share their literary interests and moral-political outlook.
The kind of work this group does is best summed up by Francis Mulhern’s 
comment that Leavisism was:
[a] quintessentially petit bourgeois revolt, directed against a cultural 
order that it could not fundamentally alter or replace [. . .] It was, 
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accordingly, a moralistic revolt from within the given culture: bearer 
not of an alternative order but of the insistence that the existing order 
should live by its word. (qtd. in Milner 113)
The above formation operates as a broadly representative national moral 
conscience that indexes events against, and demands fi delity to, the truths 
of enlightenment humanism. The high-culture humanist resonances of their 
book titles—Manne’s The Way We Live Now recycles Trollope’s title of 1875 
and imitates its moralism; Gaita’s A Common Humanity echoes F. R. Leavis’s 
The Common Pursuit—emphasise this ambition. They are thus deeply engaged 
in what Marian Sawer has described as the broader project of Australian social 
liberalism which is to defend the ideal of the interventionist, ethical state against 
the imposts of free-market ideology and the withdrawal of the state from wealth 
redistribution (Sawer). Ultimately they have provided a “soft” oppositionality 
that sets itself up in critique of formations fi gured as threats to bourgeois liberal 
mores—radical feminism, racism—but which has rarely seriously questioned 
the whiteness that arguably predicates Australian public life. 
Like the novelists mentioned above, members of the above formation have 
tended to enact a logic of whiteness even as they aspire to righteous anti-
racism, so as to maintain the authority and coherence of their own speaking 
positions. Manne’s “In Denial: The Stolen Generations and the Right”, 
published in Australian Quarterly Essay, is in many ways an exemplary text 
that mounts a sustained critique of new right attempts to discredit the 
claims of the Stolen Generation of Aboriginal children. Yet Manne’s essay 
overlooks the ways in which Aborigines have themselves exercised agency 
and resistance throughout a long history of welfarist child-theft, apart from 
mention of an entrenched “fear of the police” that resulted in people “running 
off into the bush” at the fi rst sight of offi cialdom. These are simple people, 
not people who have developed intricate informal systems for the evasion of 
white colonial authority and strong political networks, such as the National 
Tribal Council and other organisations that, since the 1960s, have repeatedly 
charged the government with human rights abuses against Aborigines (see 
Schaffer). Manne’s text includes one brief mention of “Aboriginal politics”, 
in the context of a mention of a memoir of Aboriginal political action that is 
labelled “charming” (“In Denial” 12-15). Aborigines here are understood not 
as social agents but as victims in need of charity. Women, in particular, are 
constructed almost entirely as mothers in need of chivalry. 
The dominant formations at work here, in other words, are those of the white 
family, and indeed, as Kay Schaffer has pointed out, the white Western nation. 
The staging of Manne’s text as a debate between humanist liberals and the 
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new right tends to reduce those whose lives are at stake in that debate to the 
status of “evidence” whereas issues of “national importance” are played out 
exclusively amongst whites, even as Manne himself mentions how new right 
responses to Bringing Them Home: The Stolen Generations Report overlooked 
the contribution of Aboriginal Social Justice Commissioner Mick Dodson as 
co-chair of the enquiry. Manne’s notion of “our legacy of unspeakable shame”, 
Schaffer suggests, further pertains to “a legacy of ‘the tribe’, the ancestral white 
nation of Australia that comes to stand in for the whole”. As such:
The major players in the national debate, even those who contest the 
fi ndings of the Report and those who contest the contesters, are able 
to maintain the reductionist “us” and “them” division between non-
indigenous and indigenous Australians. (Schaffer)
The way western cultural politics is done always tracks back into literary 
knowledge, as a legacy of the social mission granted to literature. As Foong 
Ling Kong has written, Garner’s The First Stone works to other those, 
including young feminists such as those portrayed negatively in the book, 
one of whom was Jewish, who “don’t fi t in” to the ordered social schema of 
Australian patrician whiteness Garner has in mind. For Kong a painting of a 
desert town in North Africa that Garner admires in the book is emblematic. 
Described by its owner as “more than beautiful [. . .] It’s accurate. It’s almost 
all white, and yet the white contains different colours as well” (The First Stone 
190), Kong argues that “[t]he painting harked back to an historical strand 
of Australian culture that Garner tried to restore in her narrative: whiteness, 
order, paternalistic authority, the trope of manhood”—all of which the young 
feminists in the book “were on the verge of destroying” (72). Garner’s Joe 
Cinque’s Consolation, too, is structured around a series of generic binarisms 
oriented around anxiety about whiteness, especially the difference between 
the old immigrant (Italian) family of the murder victim who is at the centre of 
the book, and the new immigrant (Indian) family of the murderess. Whereas 
victim Joe Cinque’s parents are “composed and civilised” (49) (“What a strong 
family they must be”(57)), the murderess’s family is portrayed as controlling 
and calculating, and remain objects of suspicion and undifferentiated 
otherness. Having noted, when she visits them, the “marked Asian fl avour” 
(186) of the shopping centre near where they live, Garner is surprised to 
discover the “old, established, bourgeois solidity” of their suburb with “its 
splendid trees” (186-7), just as she is later surprised by, and patronises, their 
middle-class confi dence. The difference between the Cinques and the Singhs 
is between good assimilator and bad, between working class humbleness and 
arriviste not-knowing-your-place, between understanding established moral 
codes and not. 
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Garner and Manne arguably represent two increasingly divergent streams in 
Australian coterie liberalism. Garner is of Old Australia, with its wariness of 
ethnic difference and its dependence on white ways of knowing, and a strand 
of liberalism that has failed to change in response to the new conservatism, 
except to internalise some of its “anti-victim” rhetoric and its championing of 
the moral politics of “personal responsibility”. Manne is arguably representative 
of an emerging self-conscious, self-critical strand in Australian liberalism, 
given that his work increasingly offers a critique from within of liberal 
whiteness, developed in response to a full-frontal confrontation with the race 
politics of the new conservatism. His introduction to an edited collection 
of essays, Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal 
History, for example, is notable for its openly political tone and its shift 
away from the benevolent white patrician register of In Denial to an implicit 
acknowledgement that different histories and different ways of knowing 
exist, and that white intellectual knowledge frames blacks. Included in the 
collection is the “Statement of Peggy Patrick”, in which Patrick tells of the 
massacre of her family by whites and how it felt to have her account personally 
ridiculed and dismissed by Windschuttle (215-17). It appears without the 
framing glosses of white “overseeing” and without editorial correction to its 
“improper” grammar. It’s perhaps no accident that such innovations appear in 
the context of the attack on the very notion of Aboriginal social agency that 
predicates Windschuttle’s work. 
There are perhaps signs of a similar shift in literary fi ction. For example, 
Andrew McGahan’s Miles Franklin Award-winning novel The White Earth 
(2004), an unabashedly political novel of white settlement, reaches back 
before the metaphysical ascendancy to adopt the mechanisms of nineteenth-
century gothic fi ction to tell its story: a family saga of illness, inheritance, 
secret rooms, mad housekeepers and a neglected mansion with its unkempt 
gardens, that is told through the eyes of a young boy. With its almost populist 
emphasis on narrative over metaphor, The White Earth seems almost crude to 
the reader accustomed to the formalist, ironic sophistication of the modern 
novel. The Aborigines in the book, who fi rst appear as symbol or metaphor, 
turn out to have agency and talk back, both to the (white) narrator and to the 
form of the novel itself, which they disrupt, just as all the typically modernist 
imaginings of metaphysicality, spirituality and connectedness with landscape 
that the novel offers up from its outset, turn out to be bogus. 
As Ken Wark has argued, little progress has taken place if, when 
history is spoken about in public [. . .] it is still the property of mostly 
white and very class-bound moral/aesthetic elite. All that’s changed 
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is that such an elite has colonised radical and critical histories and 
claimed them as the subject matter for an unchanged mode of cultural 
authority.
On the face of it he could easily be writing about Garner or Manne’s work. 
My point here though, is that gradualist though the above shifts might be, 
cultural formations such as coterie liberalism are never static, and that in the 
case of Australian coterie liberalism something has begun to change, not least 
its modes of cultural authority. Having borne witness to recent conservative 
attacks on Aborigines and asylum-seekers, in particular, and under intense 
pressure from conservatives attacking both its key fi gures and even its 
normative understandings of racial tolerance and multiculturalism, liberalism 
has arguably started to interrogate its own racialised practices. 
III
If this might seem a small and very particular local history that is therefore unable 
to say much about the more general problem of how literary criticism makes 
itself “public”, then it is a history nevertheless fi rmly located in contemporary 
global politics and in the struggles over the meaning and legacy of modernity 
and the West that constitute cultural politics today; struggles that have been 
amplifi ed since 9/11. The anxieties about whiteness, western culture and 
the presence of the Other on which social liberalism is covertly predicated, 
have moved to the centre of public life in the post-9/11 era, deployed by 
conservatives in an open and aggressive race politics, oriented around a pre-
occupation with the status of western knowledge, given the presence of others. 
This cultural and political offensive can be understood in the context of a 
remarkable thirty-year ascendancy during which conservatism has moved from 
the margins to the centre of western civic discourse, having institutionalised 
itself at almost every level, and during which liberalism has been marginalised 
and is now the subject of relentless attacks by conservatives. 
This ascendancy has changed the contexts in which literary-critical theory 
operates. Liberalism, now, is in decline as a social discourse, its institutions 
in disarray, a situation that has arguably predicated the declining relevance of 
literary-critical theory, increasingly mired in its own largely gestural repertoires, 
given its status as a largely oppositional discourse founded in a culture of 
critique. To put it bluntly, “theory” needed liberalism, even if this dependence 
was always disavowed. As the central value-generating mechanisms of social 
liberalism have lost force—the broadsheet press, public broadcasting, the 
literary novel and its canons—so, it turns out, contemporary critical theory 
was equally founded in them and is equally prey to the same forces of 
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marketisation and discrediting by conservatives. Not only does this shift in 
the location of socio-political power change the cultural dynamic in which 
“theory” operates, the critical silence that has surrounded this change refl ects 
on the effi cacy of theory as a set social practices. In short, while literary-critical 
theorists have been arguing for a post-modern ethics founded in difference 
that addresses the shortcomings of white patrician liberalism, conservatives, 
having deployed their own corrosive critique of enlightenment humanism 
and liberal democratic politics, have been far more effectively reversing the 
twentieth-century liberal-modernist program in an increasingly successful 
attempt to reinstate pre-modern conventions in such things as human rights, 
labour rights, reproductive rights, civil rights and the rights of private property. 
Embarrassingly, even as crisis has enveloped liberalism, Australian literary-
critical theorists, having failed to notice the changing contexts in which they 
operate, have failed, even, to mount a critique of the new conservatism and 
its cultures, literary, critical, political, and institutional. It is “old-style” liberal 
public intellectuals who, by and large, have made the running on important 
recent debates on issues such as the rise of “economic rationalism”, the stolen 
generations, euthanasia, asylum-seekers, human rights, torture, war, and the 
future of civil society. Whereas post-war literary-critical formations produced 
several generations of critics who made major contributions to public debate, 
contemporary Australian literary-critical theory has failed to produce a single 
fi gure who plays a leading public role in such debates. 
Recent attacks on contemporary literary-critical theory have made clear 
what the cultural stakes are in current debates, not least because such attacks 
centre on contemporary critical theory in so far as it offers a critique of white 
nationalism. Stanley Fish has outlined the ways in which 9/11 has become 
a pretext for a series of attacks on US academe that aggressively reinstated 
nationalism as the foundation for “proper” criticism. “America, love it or leave 
it!” became, as Fish suggests, the standard formulation around which dissenters 
must genufl ect; to do otherwise is to be “directly responsible for the weakening 
of the nation’s moral fi ber and indirectly responsible for the attack a weakened 
nation has suffered” (27). After 9/11, the argument went, postmodernists 
were simply proved wrong. Intellectuals in general and cultural theorists in 
particular, according to a range of mainstream commentators, needed to drop 
their anti-Western posturing, learn that the real is real, and that dealing with 
passenger jets being fl own into crowded buildings requires more than just 
understanding the politics of representation. “Cultural relativism” is out, 
moral absolutism is in; there are fundamental truths worth defending, and at 
the heart of such truths is the sanctity of the western nation. 
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The precedent for such criticisms had been set well before 9/11. In 1995 
Lynne Cheney, present US vice-president Richard Cheney’s wife, joined 
together with Senator Joseph Lieberman to create the American Council of 
Trustees and Alumni, to pressure academics and faculty to teach the “truth” 
that civilisation itself “is best exemplifi ed in the West and indeed in America” 
(Foner and Gilmore). The organisation’s November 2001 report, “Defending 
Civilisation: How Our Universities Are Failing America and What Can Be 
Done About It”, damned academics those whose professional views don’t 
uncategorically support US foreign policy, naming those whose statements 
since 9/11 it considered unpatriotic. 9/11, however, added new impetus 
to such attacks. In 2002 another neo-conservative, Daniel Pipes, used his 
Middle East Forum’s project, Campus Watch, as a vehicle to publish dossiers 
on eight “unpatriotic” university professors who had criticised US foreign 
policy. A second list identifi ed 146 further “apologists for suicide bombings 
and militant Islam” (McNeil). Articles on websites such as David Horowitz’s 
FrontPageMagazine.com have targeted individual academics as “terrorists” and 
“fi fth columnists” (Benson and Dohrn; Laksin), and Horowitz has drafted an 
Academic Bill of Rights designed to “defend ‘intellectual diversity’ on college 
campuses and remove politics from the classroom” (Horowitz). Legislatures 
in 16 US states have introduced the bill, which, for all its pretensions to 
“neutrality”, will undoubtedly have an effect on intrinsically political courses 
dealing with such things as race and gender discrimination. 
Such attacks, with their theme that teachers should “teach not preach”, have 
served as a template for Australian conservative commentators such as Andrew 
Bolt, who, in a series of columns in 2005 excoriated critical theory, singling 
out academics by name (Bolt, “Paid to be Pointless”; “A Mouthful of Tripe”; 
“A Pack of Pajeros”; “My Answer to Prof Macintyre”). Such calls can be 
understood in the context of Bolt’s calls for a return to the primacy of western 
culture (Bolt, “interview”). “In the West”, according to the conservative 
columnist Janet Albrechtsen, “moral relativism has spawned a values cringe”. 
Writing on the pernicious inability of Muslim clerics to understand Australian 
values Albrechtsen writes that:
ignorance of Western values goes beyond new immigrants. It infects 
our society [. . .]. Why aren’t our schoolchildren or university students 
learning about the individual liberty unleashed by economic freedom? 
Instead, as reported by the Australian recently, even English literature is 
taught through the prism of Marxism, decades after Marxism failed. It’s 
a bit like pressing on with fl at-earth theory even after Copernicus came 
along. Or worse, denouncing Copernicus as a heretic. (12)
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Conservative attacks on “postmodern” academic theorists, with their 
normative “back to basics” understandings of education and underpinning 
logic of whiteness, function as a coded reference to a dangerous world of pure 
cultural difference, where no race or culture is deemed superior. Bolt’s attacks 
on humanities academics worked in tandem with calls from then federal 
Education Minister Brendan Nelson to rid curricula of spurious “cappuccino 
courses”, and statements by prime minister John Howard expressing concern 
at the inroads “postmodernism” has made into curricula, amidst media and 
Federal government attacks on “critical literacy” programs in secondary 
English curricula.2
Such criticisms, with their normative understandings of education and coded 
logic of “back to basics” whiteness have a different tenor to traditional liberal 
antipathy to literary-critical theory. Whereas liberals generally attack critical 
theory in defence of modernist aesthetics and in a more or less instinctive 
reaction against the diffi cult questions theory poses about the hidden class-
cultural allegiances of liberalism, conservatives such as Cheney, Horowitz, 
Bolt or Albrechtsen are arguably doing the public relations work of a more 
aggressive neoliberal project to undo the gains of post-war liberation politics 
to do with decolonisation, group rights, and so on. Theirs is a white, populist, 
majoritarian project that goes to the heart of the politics of democratic 
representation and which seeks to undermine traditional democratic 
understandings of fairness, equality and wealth redistribution. Projects such 
as the American Council of Trustees and Alumni and the New Criterion make 
plain that the stakes in the culture wars are no longer simply nationalist but 
now involve an aggressive universalist defence of western culture. Even the 
expression “the end of relativism”, which achieved media currency in the wake 
of 9/11, covertly hints of western cultural suprematism, framed in terms of a 
rearticulation of cultural absolutism and antipathy to liberal multiculturalism. 
This essentialist turn marks the end of the post World-War II project whereby 
decolonised nations were accepted into the fold at least partly on their own 
terms (which, through the Cold War they could to some extent dictate), 
and during which mass immigration from non-white nations was allowed 
to some degree to complicate the way the West understood itself. Similarly, 
the backlash against theory can be understood as a repudiation of intellectual 
formations that seriously engage with cultural difference. 
IV
Liberalism has been a vital foil for we who set up our disciplinary concerns, and 
indeed, our disciplinary identities, in terms of a critique of modernity. Until 
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now critiquing the language of liberalism and classical humanism has been 
central to critical theory which, as a traditional left critique, has positioned 
itself outside systems and thought to establish that ways in which they work 
as common sense. But if the dominant formations at work in the public 
sphere are no longer those of liberalism, but are conservative, our focus and 
methods must therefore change. At the outset, this requires making the new 
conservatism and its social texts a sustained focus of our scholarly attentions. 
It seems extraordinary that there has been little sustained critique of the new 
conservatism from within the new humanities, given that the very “history 
of the present”, from its literatures to its political mandates, is increasingly 
underpinned by the social nostalgia, populist authoritarianism, and market 
logic of the new conservatism.
To do so will require building links, not least between the new humanities 
and liberalism. If this might seem antithetical to “our” intellectual project, 
then it should be noted that one of the keys to the success of the new 
conservatism in the US has been its coalition-building across often extremely 
wide gaps—between blue-collar workers and fi nance elites; between Christian 
“heartlanders” and academic economists. Learning to accommodate critical 
differences between strands of progressive politics is essential to political 
change. There will be no meaningful critique of conservatism until theorists 
understand and acknowledge recent shifts in liberalism and begin to make 
common cause with liberals, not least because the very formations that 
theorists have habitually critiqued, now need support. As Zygmunt Bauman 
has argued: 
the task of critical theory has been reversed. That task used to be 
the defence of private autonomy from the advancing troops of the 
“pubic sphere”, smarting under the oppressive rule of the omnipotent 
impersonal state and its many bureaucratic tentacles or their smaller-
scale replicas. The task is now to defend the vanishing public realm, or 
rather to refurnish and repopulate the public space fast emptying owing 
to the desertion of both sides: the exit of the “interested citizen”, and 
the escape of real power into the territory which, for all that the extant 
democratic institutions are able to accomplish, can only be described 
as an “outer space”. (39)
There are some incidental lessons to learn here. “Our” oft-articulated 
opposition to Leavisism and New Criticism has tended to disguise similarities. 
“We” who work in the humanities are generally of the same class as their 
practitioners, and have replicated more or less the same formations in a 
different guise, replete with canons, ritual genufl ections, and self-satisfi ed 
ritualised repertoires of meaning. We tend to circulate in narrow social 
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circles, live, eat and shop far from where blue-collar workers live or minority 
diasporas (except for touristic, often gastronomic, excursions). Our “natural” 
constituencies are generally, in fact, of precisely the same (bourgeois) cultural 
formations as are appealed to by those traditionalists we often deride. One 
of the striking things about Australian literary criticism is how white it 
remains. To glance around the faculty table is to be confronted with a sea of 
white middle-class faces; “others” are welcomed as exotics. Those “others” we 
invite in—queer lecturers, indigenous lecturers—tend to teach in their own 
identity- or region-based ghetto-fi elds. This at the same time as, in Australia 
as elsewhere, English has become entrenched as the dominant language of 
critical theory. In other words, the process of self-critique that some liberals 
have undertaken might easily be undertaken from within “theory”. 
Another lesson is more pedagogical. If traditional liberal literary theory has 
inculcated itself in what I have called the “popular critical consciousness”, then 
by this I refer to the ways in which such criticism has become one of the forms 
of academic knowledge that have a major impact outside the academy—others 
include psychology and economics—having entered, in most western nations, 
the wider vernacular. Ideas such as individual “talent”, “genius”, intrinsic 
“value”, sovereign “authorship” and “imagination”, autonomous “creativity”, 
and “felt experience” continue to strongly inform public understandings of 
literature. I refer, too, to the ways in which such literary theory continues to 
play a social role as an explicitly critical discourse that informs (and structures) 
contemporary debates about pressing social issues, and, as sketched out 
above, the ways in which, as a paradigmatic form of liberalism, it continues 
to underpin ideas about what intellectuals do, based on the secular idea that 
criticism is a form of public morality. Liberalism has done this because it 
has functioned effectively as a pedagogy and because of the ways in which 
its institutions (media, judicial, educational) have closely interlocked with 
the dominant institutions of twentieth-century state-building (economic, 
governmental, pedagogical). Because of these connections it has been able 
to frame its social message in positive terms (enlightening, educational, 
democratising), and to produce powerful social narratives that have worked 
not only at the level of high culture, but at the level of a middle and even 
low culture, in so far as liberalism has operated as a machine for producing 
narratives of secular morality. 
What I’m proposing is that in addition to high theory we embrace “low 
theory”. That is, a theory that states its concerns at the level of the vernacular 
and the popular. This doesn’t mean a process of simple “translation”, as if our 
concerns can simply be reconfi gured to other contexts more or less intact, 
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but a reassessment of ways of working and writing with the needs of different 
audiences in mind in so far as they are constitutive of our projects, that puts 
the critique of difference and representation in new frames. Low theory would 
also involve learning to use the logic of affect since, as Larry Grossberg has 
pointed out, this is the logic of contemporary politics and the public sphere 
(257-9). This is in part why the affective language of critics such as Garner and 
Manne has resonance. If this might sound populist then that isn’t necessarily 
the case. Rather than proceed from the abstract, we need to proceed from 
accounts of people and place so as to tell stories that make our concerns real 
in ways that resonate with broader audiences. Such discursive stratagems, it 
seems to me, should be the very thing that theorists are good at. 
At the same time, we might rediscover “our” voice and responsibilities 
as intellectuals, having passed such responsibilities over to “consumers” of 
culture in a populist move that tallies neatly enough with the populist logic 
of the new conservatism (even as, covertly, like such conservatives, we seek to 
retain our status as arbiters). As Larry Grossberg has said:
The fact that authority is socially constructed, that all knowledge is 
historically implicated with systems of power, does not mean that 
all authority can or should be rejected, or that all systems of power 
are equally condemnable. Too often, left intellectuals seem to think 
that their only responsibility is to give over their speaking position to 
those less capable of manipulating the codes of public discourse and 
perhaps less knowledgeable about certain matters. I am not trying to 
suggest that nonintellectuals are dopes or not worth listening to. On 
the contrary, I am suggesting that intellectual labor produces its own 
value which we must be able and willing to use. (267)
If one of the great lessons of the ongoing public tenure of postwar critical 
forms is the power of effective pedagogy, then with the above in mind we 
might also make a renewed commitment to effective teaching. Many enrol 
in the humanities in the hope of fi nding specifi c counter-discourses to those 
offered in mainstream discussion, yet academics are often poor at delivering 
them. Too often academic practice is oriented around the old leftist dream 
of creating an elite counter-society of critics, at the expense of thinking of 
all students as potential lifelong autonomous critical agents. Much of what 
we offer, in the form of abstracted lectures that are really the start of peer-
directed papers or that derive from our latest research enthusiasm, makes little 
connection to students’ lives and experiences. Often the only subject position 
offered students is as potential initiates into an arcane order, oriented around 
reverence for certain key theorists and critical practices that many fi nd either 
alienating or simply ridiculous, while an over-anxious elite dutifully “learns the 
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discourse” so as to take up a place in a hierarchy that is often uncomfortably 
reminiscent of the most clubbish excesses of post-war literary criticism. 
White western nationalism is always at stake in questions about the role of 
criticism, not least literary criticism, and recent reiterations of the cultural logic 
of whiteness makes the project of critical theory more, not less, important. 
That the central ideas of contemporary critical theory—its key term is 
“difference”—should acquire popular valency is therefore important given its 
ongoing project of critiquing the white logic of nation. This project that has 
become urgent in the wake of 9/11, the “war on terror” and the war in Iraq, 
where the logics of white nationalism are amplifi ed in the context of a coded 
western suprematism, where the logocentric politics of presence, empiricism 
and affect have become all-important, not least because the rise of the new 
conservatism since the mid-1970s has undermined liberation politics and 
changed many of its key defi nitions, in a specifi c assault on accepted notions 
of “rights”, “equality” and “democracy”, not to mention those of education 
and criticism. It has been easy for theorists to imagine themselves as above 
all this, having superseded mere humanism. Few seem to realise how much 
has changed, and how all the fundamental ideals of the twentieth-century 
civilising project now need to be fought for all over again. 
NOTES
 1 Garner’s The First Stone gets going with “rushes of horror”, “twinges of alarm”, 
and a “stab” of curiosity, follows with “a rush of terrible sadness”, and a “gradual 
chilling of my blood”, and concludes with “a bomb of fury and disgust” that 
Garner felt “go off inside my head” (16, 37, 122, 125, 156). A similar series 
of visceral reactions underpins the narrative of Joe Cinque’s Consolation. At 
different parts of the story Garner has her “girl-hackles” raised, is enveloped 
in a “blur of warmth”, or fi lled with “a wary, puzzled curiosity”, depending on 
whether she is in contact with the guilty or the innocent. She also becomes an 
almost involuntary medium for stories of signifi cance: “A story lies in wait for a 
writer. It fl ashes out silent signals”, Garner says. “Without knowing she is doing 
it, the writer receives the message, drops everything, and turns to follow” (18, 
66, 25). In Manne’s The Culture of Forgetting, his book on the hoax novelist 
Helen Darville-Demidenko he sets up his diagnosis of the affair so as to present 
his physical shock, which he details at length, at Darville’s anti-Semitism, as 
evidence of a general national cultural decline, as if he were a living, chemical 
moral barometer of the national moral health. Shock combined with high moral 
rectitude plays a similar part in Manne’s 2005 essay on Christos Tsiolkas’s novel 
Dead Europe, in which Manne accuses Tsiolkas of anti-Semitism. suggesting 
that Manne understands himself as the personifi cation of a more generalised 
moral code that the book transgresses.
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 2 The Australian began such a campaign in 2005 with a series of aggressive 
anti-critical-literacy articles notable for their almost complete absence of 
counter-comment. It was diffi cult, moreover, to determine precisely what they 
were campaigning against. Many academic teachers of critical theory would 
sympathise with their attacks on “outcome-based” education and championing 
of better basic literacy skills, but these were mixed in a confused mélange with 
attacks on postmodernism, popular culture, and the very notion that students 
should develop any sort of critical faculties as part of their formal education. 
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